Introduction
The modern notion of axiomatic method stems from works in foundations of mathematics starting in the late 19th century, most prominently from Hilbert's Foundations of Geometry first published in 1899 [11] , [13] . Recently this method has been defended (in its semantic version) by Hintikka [18] . In this paper I argue that this notion of axiomatic method is not fully adequate to the current mathematical practice. As a remedy I describe a Date: October 21, 2014 . The work is supported by Russian State Foundations for Humanities, research grant number 13-03-cannot be used as premises in logical inferences -if by logical inference one understands an operation that takes some propositions (premises) as its input and produces some other proposition or propositions (conclusion) as its output 4 . In fact Postulates 1-3 are themselves schemes, aka rules, of certain basic operations, which take some geometrical objects as input and produce some other geometrical objects as output. P1-3 qualify as rules in the same sense of the term in which one usually talks about rules of inference in logic. However P1-3 apply to geometrical rather than logical operations. The These operations are partly composable in the obvious way: the output of P1-operation is used as input for P2-and P3-operations. This system of operations extended by some further basic operations assumed tacitly 5 serves Euclid for "introducing objects" of his theory. Such an introduction is systematic in the sense that it does not reduce to a simple act of stipulation: it is a procedure, which involves certain elementary operations (including P1-P3) and complex operations obtained through the composition of the elementary operations. As soon as the term deduction is understood liberally as a theoretical procedure, which generates some fragments of a given theory from the first principles of this theory, one can say that Euclid's geometrical constructions are deductive. The constructive deductive order is also called the genetic order. As we shall shortly see in Euclid's theory the constructive deduction is tightly related to the more familiar logical deduction, which operates with propositions.
Postulates and Axioms of are followed by the so-called Propositions. This commonly used title is not found in Euclid's original text where things called by later editors "Propositions"
are simply numbered but not called by any common name [6] . From Proclus' Commentary [37] , (Eng. tr. [38] ) written in the 5th century A.D. we learn about the tradition dating back to Euclid's own times (and in fact even to earlier times) of distinguishing between the two sorts of "Propositions", namely Problems and Theorems. Euclid's Theorems by and large are theorems in the modern sense of the word: propositions followed by proofs. But
Problems are something different: they are derived rules for making complex geometrical constructions. Like Postulates Problems admit no truth-values and thus don't qualify as propositions either. Unlike Postulates Problems always require a justification aka solution.
This is why I call these further rules derived. As we shall now see Euclid's Problems are not solved on the basis of (and hence are not derived from) P1-3 and tacit constructive rules alone
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.
What I have said so far can make one imagine that Euclid's theory splits into two independent parts: one consisting of constructive rules derived from Postulates and the other consisting of propositions derived from Axioms. Such a split does not occur for two complementary reasons:
-(solutions of) non-trivial Problems require (propositional) proofs, which show that the obtained constructions have the required properties;
-(proofs of) non-trivial Theorems require constructions, which are conventionally called "auxiliary". 6 As an example of Problem consider the initial fragment of Proposition 1, Book 1: "To construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight-line". It is followed by (i) an appropriate construction and
(ii) a proof that the obtained construction is equilateral triangle. For interpretation of this Proposition as a rule see [34] , p. 93. Panza says here that this Proposition "provides a new constructive rule". I make a stronger claim saying that this Proposition (which is not a proposition in the usual logical sense) is this new rule. Saying that I distinguish as usual between a given Problem (= constructive rule) and solution of this Problem, which justifies this rule.
This explains why the logical deductive order of Theorems and the genetic order of Problems in Euclid's theory form a joint deductive order
7
. In Section 5 below I explain how the Curry-Howard correspondence supports a similar structure, which combines propositional and non-propositional forms of deduction.
All Euclid's Postulates and initial fragments (i.e., bare formulations) of Problems can be easily paraphrased into propositions. This can be done at least in two different ways. The following paraphrases of P1 are self-explanatory:
P1m (modal): Given two (different) points it is always possible to produce a straight segment from one given point to the other given point.
P1e (existential): Given two (different) points there exists a straight segment having these given points as its endpoint.
P1e instantiates what Hilbert and Bernays call the "existential form" used in the formal axiomatic method. The key logical feature of this paraphrase (which it shares with P1m) is the reduction of Euclid's non-propositional Postulates and Problems to certain propositions (in case of P1e -to existential propositions). Such a reduction may look trivial and even purely linguistic but in fact it is not because none of the two ways of paraphrasing is sufficient for translating Euclid's theory into a propositional form, i.e., into a theory consisting of axioms and theorems derived from the axioms according to certain fixed rules of logical inference. The difficulty is, of course, that the straightforward propositional paraphrasing does not translate proofs and constructions coherently, so in order to provide a reasonable reconstruction of Euclid's theory in the propositional form one needs a lot of further efforts [19] . For further references I shall call a procedure, which aims at replacement of all non-propositional content of a given theory by some suitable propositional content, the propositional reduction of this theory.
Thanks to Proclus we know that the idea of propositional reduction of Problems to Theorems is very old. But from the same source we also know about the contemporary competing idea of considering Theorems as Problems of a special sort (see [38] , p. 63-64). Both proposals make equally strong echoes of more recent controversies about constructive and non-constructive approaches in mathematics. Thus there is neither historical nor obvious theoretical reason for taking for granted the common idea according to which the propositional reduction is the first necessary step in any modern logical reconstruction of ancient mathematics. Notice that Euclid's geometry exemplifies Hilbert and Bernays' notion of constructive axiomatic theory only if the non-propositional content of this theory is properly taken into the account but not reduced to some propositional form (existential, modal or some other).
Hilbert's Views on Axiomatic Method
Since presently there exists an extensive literature, which analyses Hilbert's work on ax- Our theory furnishes only the schema of concepts connected to each other through the unalterable laws of logic. It is left to human reason how it wants to apply this schema to appearance, how it wants to fill it with material.
( [10] , p. 104)
The two key features of this notion of theory are (i) its schematic character and (ii) its logical grounding. Let me first focus on (ii). Hilbert refers to the "unalterable laws of logic" as something definite and somehow known. A weaker assumption which we may attribute to Hilbert and which still allows us to make sense of his words is that the laws of logic are epistemically more reliable than any mathematical and scientific knowledge, so it makes sense to use these laws as a foundation in mathematical and scientific theories.
The fixity of logic is important for understanding the schematic character (i) of Hilbert's axiomatic theories. Axioms and theorems of non-interpreted formal theory are propositional schemes, which admit truth values (and thus turn into propositions) through an interpre-
tation. An interpretation amounts to assigning to terms like "point", "straight line", etc.
certain semantic values, which can be borrowed from another mathematical theory or from some extra-theoretical sources like intuition and experience. However this game of multiple interpretations does not concern all terms of a given theory. Some terms, namely logical terms, have fixed meanings, which (at least in the early versions of Hilbert's axiomatic approach) is supposed to be self-evident. The different treatment of logical and non-logical terms reflects the epistemological assumption according to which logical concepts have an epistemic priority over non-logical concepts.
In Foundations of 1899 [11] and other Hilbert's early axiomatic theories the "laws of logic" are taken for granted but not specified explicitly and precisely. Hilbert addresses this problem in 1917 saying that "it appears necessary to axiomatize logic itself" ( [14] p. 1113).
He find a solution of the problem by applying in logic symbolic methods
8
. The later mature form of his formal axiomatic method presented in [16] also involves such a symbolic setting.
8 Hintinkka [18] quite rightly stresses the fact that between axiomatizing geometry (or another nonlogical theory) and axiomatizing logic there is no continuity. He argues that a recursive enumeration of logical truths that Hilbert calls axiomatization is called so improperly because such a procedure doesn't allow for studying models of logic in anything like the same way in which one studies models of any other formal theory. In what follows (Sections 6 and 7) I describe a possible solution of this problem that blurs the distinction between logical and non-logical terms and allows logical terms to have non-logical interpretations.
This mature axiomatic method reinforced by symbolic logic has some important features, which are wholly absent in Hilbert's early conception of this method described above.
While in the early version a non-interpreted axiomatic theory is understood as a "scheme of concepts" devoid of any intuitive content the later symbolic version of axiomatic method includes an additional assumption according to which this abstract scheme has its proper concrete representation, namely the symbolic representation. The symbolic representation involves a special sort of intuition, which Hilbert calls the "logico-combinatorial intuition"
( [9] , p. 179). A mathematical study of symbolic calculi (which include logical calculi proper and symbolic representations of formal theories based on these calculi) Hilbert isolates into a special area of mathematics, which he calls metamathematics. Hilbert perfectly realizes that treating the metamathematics with the same formal axiomatic method leads to a hopeless infinite regress. So his foundational project at this point becomes different and in certain respects more modest (albeit in some other respects more radical) than earlier:
now he aims at isolating a limited area of elementary (and as he really hoped -only finitary) mathematics developed constructively and then treat the rest of mathematics on this constructive basis using appropriate non-constructive "idealizing existence assumptions"
( [17] , p. 19). So at that point the formal axiomatic method is no longer seen by Hilbert as self-sustained: it needs a support of constructive methods operating at the metatheoretical level. Hintikka [18] doesn't follow Hilbert here but rather elaborates on the early version of his formal axiomatic method. Namely, Hintikka construes his basic notion of logical inference as the semantic consequence rather than the syntactic formal consequence studied by Hilbert and Bernays in their metamathematics. In Section 8 I argue that Hintikka's semantic version of formal axiomatic method similarly needs a constructive support.
Curry-Howard Correspondence and Cartesian Closed Categories
The present Section is a preliminary to the following two Sections 6,7 where I treat modern examples of axiomatic theories. In a nutshell the idea of a Curry-Howard correspondence is given in Kolmogorov's 1932 paper [20] where the author establishes that his newly proposed calculus of problems has exactly the same structure as the intuitionistic propositional calculus published in 1930 by Heyting 9 . It turns out that this correspondence is extendible onto a large class of symbolic calculi including those, which have been developed independently and apparently for very different purposes. So there were established a number of correspondences (i.e., of more and less precise isomorphisms) between (proof-related) logical calculi (propositional, first-order or higher-order), on the one hand, and computational calculi (the simply-typed lambda calculus, type systems with dependent types, polymorphic type systems), on the other hand [43] . This led to the so called "proofs-as-programs and propositions-as-types" paradigm in logic and Computer science, which can be called constructive in the relevant sense. Indeed, when Hilbert and Bernays distinguish between the broadly constructive and the formal versions of the axiomatic method they firmly assume that propositions and theoretical objects (of the same contentual theory) belong to distinct domains of things. They don't treat this distinction formally but simply take it for granted. Within the propositions-as-types paradigm this distinction is made formally and explicitly: propositions are represented as types, namely as the types of their corresponding proofs. So within this paradigm propositions are treated as types of objects along with other (non-propositional) types of objects belonging the same theory 10 . Within this paradigm building proofs is a special case of building theoretical objects in general. Recall that a theory qualifies as constructive in the relevant sense when it includes procedures for building objects other than propositions.
9 I am not making any priority claim for Kolmogorov here but simply use his 1932 article as a convenient reference. A relevant historical material can be found in [2] and [41] but a more focused historical study on the idea of Curry-Howard correspondence still waits to be written. Such a study might show that the Curry-Howard correspondence is not just an "amazing" mathematical phenomenon ( [43] , p. 5) but a case of genuine convergence of several different lines of research in logic and foundations of mathematics. 10 I emphasize that we are talking here about the same theory because propositions and proofs of given theory can be also made into objects otherwise, namely, by considering them as objects of a metatheory of the given theory. But this is a different matter.
The Curry-Howard correspondence shows that certain symbolic calculi of different kinds share a common structure. It is natural to ask whether this shared structure can be presented in some invariant way, which would not depend on particularities of syntactic presentations of these symbolic calculi. This problem has been solved in 1963 by means of mathematical Category theory by Lawvere [24] , who observed that certain categories This fact does not prevent one from construing ETCS as a standard formal axiomatic theory [32] but nevertheless suggests a reconsidering of the place and the role of logic in this theory. One can use the above observation for arguing that ETCS is after all a logical theory, which shows that the Set theory is in fact a part of logic. However this way of thinking about ETCS would commit one to qualify Lawvere's axiomatic Topos theory, which I present in the next Section, also as a logical theory. Although there is indeed a sense in which Topos theory qualifies as logical there is also an obvious sense in which this theory is geometric 12 . Thus the relationships between logical and non-logical concepts in both cases require a further examination.
Topos theory
The concept of topos first appeared in Algebraic Geometry in the circle of Alexandre
Grothendieck around 1960 as a far-reaching generalization of the standard concept of topological space and didn't have any special relevance to logic. In his seminal paper [23] Lawvere provided an axiomatic definition of topos called today elementary topos 13 .
Like ETCS the axiomatic theory of elementary topos does not bring by itself any new 12 Throughout this paper I use the word "geometric" in a broad sense that covers all space-related concepts including the topological ones. 13 The title "elementary" reflects the fact that Lawvere's definition (unlike Grothendieck's original definition) is expressible in the standard first-order formal language [32] . The concept of elementary topos is slightly more general than that of Grothendieck topos: there are elementary toposes, which are not Grothendieck toposes.
notion of axiomatic theory. However any systematic exposition of topos theory contains a chapter on the internal logic of a topos. In standard textbooks the internal logic is introduced as an extra feature on the top of the basic topos construction [32] , [28] . As usual it has a syntactic part (Mitchel-Bénabou language) and a formal semantic part, which interprets the Mitchel-Bénabou syntax in terms of constructions available in the base topos (Kripke-Joyal semantics). Kripke-Joyal semantics assigns to symbols and syntactic expressions, which have an intuitive logical meaning (logical connectives, quantifiers, truth-values, etc.), explicit semantic values, which otherwise can be called geometrical (since the base topos is a generalized space). This is not something wholly unprecedented in the history of the 20th century logic: think, for example, of Tarski's topological semantics for Classical and Intuitionistic propositional logic [45] . However this feature of Kripke-Joyal semantics makes it quite unlike a notion of semantics derived from the idea of interpreting a formal theory by assigning explicit semantic values only to its non-logical elements (compare Section 4 above).
Internal logic L T can be used for developing further axiomatic theories "internally" in given topos T . It also provides an additional "internal" description of T itself ( [32] , Ch.
16). If one looks at Lawvere's [23] where the axioms for elementary topos first appeared in the press, one can see that namely the internal logical analysis of topos concept allows
Lawvere to formulate these axioms: he observes that the internal logic of general topos and the internal logic of Set share the same CCC structure and thus the wanted axiomatic Topos theory is obtained through a simple generalization of ETCS:
[A] Grothendieck "topology" appears most naturally as a modal operator, of the nature "it is locally the case that", the usual logical operators, such as ∀, ∃, ⇒ have natural analogues which apply to families of geometrical objects rather than to propositional functions. This logical analysis of Grothendieck's geometric topos concept is quite unlike Hilbert's logical analysis of geometric concepts, which relies onto the "unalterable laws of logic".
Unlike Hilbert, Lawvere doesn't use logic as a ready-made tool for sorting out intuitive geometric concepts but rather makes explicit a logical structure "naturally" associated with certain geometric concepts. The popular word "natural" refers here to the fact that logic and geometry in a topos share a common categorical structure, which includes the CCC structure.
One may argue that this feature of Lawvere's axiomatic approach can matter only when 
Homotopy Type theory and Univalent Foundations
Homotopy Type theory (HoTT) is a recently emerged field of mathematical research, which has a special relevance to philosophy and logic because it serves as a basis for a new tentative axiomatic foundations of mathematics called the Univalent Foundations (UF) [46] , [5] . In this paper I do not attempt to review HoTT and UF systematically but only describe a special character of its axiomatic architecture.
HoTT emerged through a synthesis of two lines of research, which earlier seemed to be quite unrelated: geometrical Homotopy theory and logical Type theory. The key idea is that of modeling types (including the type of propositions) and terms (including proofs)
in Type theory by spaces and their points in Homotopy Theory. Beware that along with basic spaces Homotopy theory also considers path spaces where "points" are paths in the basic spaces, spaces of "paths between paths" called homotopies, spaces of "paths between paths between paths" and so on. All these higher-order spaces are also used for interpreting types.
Like in Topos theory, in HoTT geometry and logic are glued together with some categorytheoretic concepts. The central categorical concept used in HoTT is that of ω − groupoid.
In the standard category theory a groupoid is defined as a category where all morphisms between objects are reversible, i.e., are isomorphisms. ω-groupoid is a higher-categorical Under the homotopical interpretation this rule becomes (HF): Given spaces A, B to produce space A → B of continuous maps from space A to space B, which has exactly the same form as Euclid's First Postulate allowing for producing a straight line from a given point to another given point
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. Claiming that HoTT is constructive theory I need to pay a particular care for disambiguating the term "constructive"
properly. MLTT is constructive in a strong sense, which makes this theory computable.
It is not known to the date whether or not HoTT with AU is constructive in the same strong sense; prima facie it is not ( [5] , p. 11). Anyway HoTT with AU is constructive in the weaker sense of being constructive, which I borrow from Hilbert and Bernays and use throughout this paper. Hintikka's recent paper [18] where the author defends a modern version of Hilbert's formal axiomatic method. I shall try to show that this formal method is not self-sustained and needs to be supported by a modern constructive method like one used in HoTT.
Hintikka:
What is crucial in the axiomatic method [..] is that an overview on the axiomatized theory is to capture all and only the relevant structures as so many models of the axioms. ( [18] , p. 72)
Where these structures come from? Hintikka gives the following answer:
The class of structures that the axioms are calculated to capture can be either given by intuition, freely chosen or else introduced by experience (ib., p. 83)
One may wonder how a mathematical structure or a structure of some different sort can be "given" or "introduced" without being construed axiomatically beforehand. Should we take at this point a Platonistic view according to which mathematical structures in some form exist independently of our axiomatic descriptions of these structures? Hintikka's answer is different. He explicitly rejects the notion of intuition as an intellectual analogue of senseperception and insists that the intuition (along with the free choice and the experience) may argue that this point of view is in fact more general than the more familiar Quinean "logical point of view" [39] . I leave a further discussion on this foundational issue for another occasion. My concern is about the kind of games that we need to play with Nature for doing science and mathematics. Although yes-no questioning games indeed play an important role in science and perhaps also in mathematics I claim that this is only the top of an iceberg. The main body of this iceberg is filled by mathematical and empirical constructive activities such as designing new experiments. If we consider applications of mathematics outside the pure science we may also mention the role of mathematical in engineering. In order to design a bridge or a particle accelerator one usually plays with certain mathematical models of these things, not with formal axioms.
Since such activities qualify as instances of Hintikka's "active thought-experiment" I hardly diverge from Hintikka up to this point. The divergence comes next. I don't grant Hintikka's view according to which the mathematical thought experimentation is, generally, a spontaneous ruleless activity, which should be studied by "empirical psychologists" rather I agree with Hintikka that this fact does not mean that one has here a choice between appealing to irrational resources and giving up the semantical view on logical consequence altogether (ib., p. 77-78). In order to construe the relation of semantic consequence with a mathematical precision one should fix some formal semantics, which allows for doing the truth-evaluation properly (as in the case of Kripke-Joyal semantics for topos logic) 17 . In The above analysis suggests a view on the truth-evaluation as an advanced rather than basic feature of mathematical and other theories. Unlike Topos theory, HoTT in its existing form has no resources for doing truth-evaluation internally. There is however a "general consensus" that an internal truth-evaluation for HoTT can be construed within a higher-order topos structure in which HoTT would play the role of internal language ( [5] , p. 12). This recent mathematical example illustrates the thesis that the constructive axiomatic method is more general and more basic than the formal version of this method, which requires the truth-evaluation. This thesis is plausible since mathematics and science not only seek for truths and logical relations between those truths but also for effective methods of doing this and that. The two kinds of knowledge are called in the literature the knowledge-that and the knowledge-how [8] . From a historical viewpoint it is obvious -specify the class M (AT ) of models of WT by evaluating formulas from AT in M Formula φ is called a semantic consequence of AT , in symbols AT |= φ, iff φ is a tautology in M (WT ). 18 In the last quote Hintikka says that the notion of logical (=semantic) consequence can be made more precise by introducing some "new logical principles" suggested by the intuitive thought-experimentation with mathematical structures. Talking about constructive methods I have in mind constructive principles specific for a given theory like Euclid's Postulates, which, generally, don't qualify as logical.
that the knowledge-how is a more primitive form of knowledge, which can exist outside any scientific context. When science is brought into the picture there is an unfortunate tendency to isolate the relevant knowledge-how either in a special domain of applied science (and applied mathematics) or in social, psychological, educational, pragmatic and other contexts of doing science and then consider scientific and mathematical theories outside of these contexts. In this paper I have shown that such a separation of knowing how from knowing that cannot work for axiomatic mathematical theories because in this case the two types of knowledge are interlaced at the atomic level of theoretical reasoning. The case of experimental sciences prima facie appears similar but requires a separate study, which I leave for a future research.
